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Summary  findings
Efficient reduction of carbon dioxide emissions requires  Lowering the price of energy-intensive products
coordination  of international efforts. Approaches  relative to other products.
proposed include carbon taxes, emission quotas, and  Martin explores the consequences of these second-
jointly implemented energy projects.  round impacts and suggests  ways to deal with them in
To reduce emissions efficiently requires equalizing the  practical joint-implementation  projects.
marginal costs of reduction between countries. The  For example, the direct impact of reducing the
apparently large differentials between the costs of  effective price of a fuel is to increase consumption of that
reducing emissions in industrial and developing countries  fuel. Generally, substitution effects also reduce the use of
implies a great potential for lowering the costs of  other fuels, and the emissions generated from them.
reducing emissions by focusing on projects in developing  If the fuel whose efficiency is being improved is
countries.  already the least emission-intensive, the combined impact
Most proposals for joint implementation of energy  of these price effects is most likely to be favorable.
projects emphasize installing more technically efficient  If the fuel whose efficiency is being improved is
capital equipment, to allow reductions in energy use for  initially the most emission-intensive, the combined
any given mix of input and output.  But such increases in  impact of these price changes is less likely to be favorable
efficiency are likely to have potentially important  and may even increase emissions.
second-round  impacts:  In the example Martin uses, increase in coal use
* Lowering the relative effective price of specific  efficiency was completely ineffective in reducing
energy products.  emissions because it resulted in emission-intensive coal
a  Lowering the price of energy relative to other  being substituted for less polluting oil and gas.
inputs.
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through Joint Implementation of Projects
Sustainable  reduction  in global  greenhouse  gas emissions  requires  internationally
coordinated  policy action. Reaching  such a position  is difficult  because of the different
interests  of sovereign  states, and the incentives  for free riding on the actions of others.
The solution  must lie in a set of policies  that reduce  costs by being  efficient  in achieving
greenhouse  gas emnissions,  and equitable  in the burden that it imposes on individual
countries.  While there is great uncertainty  about the burden likely to be involved  in the
required reductions  in emissions,  it is clear from S02 emissions  trading in the United
States  that efficient  policies  can greatly  reduce  the costs of any given reduction'.
Three broad policies  have been proposed  for achieving  reductions  in greenhouse
gas emissions  - quotas,  taxes and  joint implementation  (JI) projects.  Quota approaches
have intuitive  appeal in that they focus on achieving  specific,  tangible goals. However,
except in extreme cases such as the ban on chlorofluorocarbons,  national quotas are
likely  to be an inefficient  approach  to achieving  any given  reduction  in global  greenhouse
gases.  Fixed national  quotas and emission  reductions  are likely to require reductions  in
some countries at much higher costs than in others.  Approaches that move toward
equalizing  the marginal costs of reducing emissions across countries will lower the
overall  costs of achieving  any given  reduction  in emissions  and make it more  likely  that a
sustainable  agreement  can be achieved.
l  The need to use the most efficient approach  to emissions  reduction will be particularly  great if
emissions  are, as argued  by Schmalensee,  Stoker  and  Judson  (1998),  increasing  at substantially  higher
rates  than  projected  by the IPCC.One approach to the problem with national quotas would be to  define national
quotas and to allow them to be traded between countries. Countries with high costs of
emission reductions would find it worthwhile to purchase quotas from countries where
the costs  of  reducing emissions were  lower. In the  long run,  the marginal  costs of
emission reduction would fall in the quota-purchasing countries and rise in the quota-
selling countries. A problem with this approach is that it is likely to lead to very large
international transfers of quota rents - perhaps more than could be sustained or enforced
between sovereign countries.
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997) have proposed an interesting alternative policy
involving an initial national quota supplemented by additional units of quota sold at an
internationally agreed price. This would reduce the distributional problems associated
with  international  transfers  of  quota  rents 2,  and  ensure  that  the  marginal  costs  of
emissions were equalized worldwide. At the margin, this policy would have essentially
the same impacts as an internationally agreed tax on energy use.
Stiglitz (1997) reviews the approaches for reducing global carbon emissions, and
emphasizes the need for developing countries to participate in reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions. For one of the main greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide, he points out that
developing  countries  already  emit  as  much carbon  from  industrial  processes as  do
developed countries. By the middle of the next century, carbon dioxide emissions from
developing countries are likely to be twice those from the current OECD countries. This
2  However, it would still not seem to deal with the international transfers between net energy exporters
and importers that would follow from declining world prices of carbon-intensive energy products.
Clearly, this distributional concern could potentially be dealt with by levying part of any agreed tax
on the production side and part on the consumption side.
2implies that the task of reducing emissions in developing countries will be enormous and
increases the importance of sound policy design.
In the long run, some form of internationally agreed carbon tax or set price at
which emission permits can be sold seems likely to be the most efficient solution to this
problem.  However, we are a long way from reaching the international consensus for such
policies that would be required for their effective implementation. The recently agreed
Kyoto Protocol provides for quotas on emissions in the industrial countries only, with the
developing countries pointing out that the current stock of emissions  is primarily the
result of past and present emissions from today's industrial countries.
The Kyoto Protocol provides for  some potential mitigation  of the  costs  of a
system  of  national quotas  through  provisions  for  a  clean  development  mechanism
(UNFCCC 1997). This could increase the efficiency with which reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions are made by allowing countries to substitute lower-cost reductions overseas
for higher-cost reductions at home 3. Engineering evidence suggests that the  costs of
achieving given reductions in energy use are frequently lower in developing countries
even without quotas in the industrial countries. These differentials are likely to become
considerably  larger  if  binding  quotas  are  enforced  in  the  industrial  countries.  As
developed countries use up their lowest-cost abatement options, the marginal costs of
achieving larger reductions will rise.
3  The Kyoto Convention uses the term joint implementation to refer to activities between the industrial
countries whose emissions are subject to agreed quotas (Article 6). Joint activities between industrial
and developing countries are covered by the clean development mechanism (Article 12). The focus of
this  paper  is  en  joint  activities between  industrial and  developing  countries and  the  termn  joint
implementation is used to refer to these activities.
3A difficulty faced by joint  implementation approaches of the type envisaged by
the Kyoto Protocol is the measurement of the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
While quotas and taxes focus on the emissions of  greenhouse gases, a  project-based
approach such as the clean development mechanism must focus on the somewhat more
speculative concept of "reductions in  emissions that are additional to  any that would
occur in the absence of the certified project activity" (UNFCCC, pl2).
A  key  step  in  estimating  the  impact  of  a  joint  implementation  project  on
emissions  is to  take  into account the  direct  impact of the  project  on the  output of
greenhouse gases per unit of output. The approach taken in this paper is that this input-
output approach is necessary, but  not sufficient for assessing the total  impact of the
project on emissions. The central point of this paper is that it is highly likely that the
technical changes created by joint  implementation will affect emissions indirectly by
induced changes in the level and mix of energy and other inputs into production - and
that these indirect effects may be large. The changes in technique brought about by joint
implementation will  also have impacts  on consumer prices  of  some  goods, and the
consequent changes in the pattern of consumption may also need to be taken into account.
Once the impact of the technical change induced by a joint implementation project
on the demand for carbon fuels has been identified, one further step is needed before the
results can be compared with ex post reductions in emissions of the type achieved using
emissions  quotas.  This  step  involves the  price responsiveness of  the  supply of  the
different types of energy. If the price elasticities of supply for these energy sources are
4low, much of the impact of a reduction in demand ma$ tall on the price of that fuel, rather
than on the level of its use.
The next  section of the  paper deals with the nature  of joint  implementation
projects, and the likely impacts of these projects on energy use patterns. The third section
considers the elasticities and CO 2 intensities that are needed as a basis for evaluating the
impacts of the joint  implementation projects. The fourth section presents some simple
numerical estimates designed both to provide an order of magnitude indication of the
likely importance of the phenomenon under consideration for particular types of project.
In the fifth section, the supply side of the energy market is considered. The final section
presents  some  conclusions  and  suggestions  on  approaches  for  evaluation  of  joint
implementation projects.
Joint Implementation and Technical Change
The joint implementation projects envisaged under the Kyoto Protocol have two
stated goals: to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development, and to
assist the  industrial countries by  allowing them to  use certified  emission reductions
against their reduction commitments. To  achieve these objectives, the projects clearly
must  change the production processes used in  the developing countries. One way  in
which they might  do this  is by  substituting a  less-polluting technology  for  the  one
currently in  use, without  necessarily improving the overall  efficiency of production.
Another way would be  to  introduce technology that is  superior to  that previously in
5operation in the country. Changes in technique of the first type would contribute to the
carbon emission goal, but not necessarily to the development goal, while changes of the
second type seem more likely to contribute to both goals.
A general framework for categorizing the various types of technical change that
might be used in joint implementation is provided in Alston and Martin (1994). Using the
producer profit function 4, they categorize technical changes into three broad types:  (a)
those  represented by  direct incorporation of technical change  variables in  the profit
function (Binswanger  1974; Kohli  1991); (b) those represented through  a  distinction
between  actual and  effective quantities and prices (eg Dixon, Parmenter,  Sutton and
Vincent 1982); and (c) those represented through changes in the parameters of profit or
production functions (eg Fulginiti and Perrin 1993).
For technical changes that affect variable inputs, these three different types of
technical change may be represented as:
(a)  7t  =  g(p,v,'rla)
(b)  7t  =  g(p(),  v I (cc)
(c)  i  =  g(p, v I  a(X))
where  7t  is the producer profit from the activity under  consideration; p is  the
vector of input and output prices facing producers in the country; v is a vector of fixed
inputs (and perhaps outputs); a  is the vector of parameters of the profit function; and T a
vector of parameters representing the technical changes under consideration.
4  This profit function  may be a simple,  partial  equilibrium  profit function  for a single industry  able to
purchase  all of its inputs  at fixed  prices  (see  Binswanger  1974  for this general  type of application),  or
an economy-wide  profit function representing  the technology  for production  of total GDP in the
6The profit function approach to  the specification of  changes in techniques  of
production is particularly desirable when the objective of the analysis is to consider the
welfare impacts of the technical change, and hence the contribution of the project to
development. As  shown by  Martin and  Alston (1997), the welfare  consequences of
particular types of technical change may be substantially greater than would be suggested
by  the  producer surplus techniques that  have typically  been used to  measure  these
benefits. For a cost-reducing technical change in a commodity supplied with an elasticity
of 0.5, for example, the producer surplus methodology understates the welfare benefits by
just over half.
The profit function approach outlined above is also a useful organizing framework
for  considering  the  impacts  of  different  types  of  JI-induced  technical  changes  on
greenhouse gas emissions. For the evaluation of these projects, it seems likely that the
most relevant form of technical change will be type (b), although some projects may
perhaps usefully be  categorized by type (c).  Type (a) is typically  used in  relatively
stylized representations of technical change, where the specific form of technical change
is either not  known, or cannot be specified with precision. Almost  by definition, the
nature of the change in technique is well known and understood when a JI project is
undertaken.
Most practical applications of  Type (b) technical change involve a distinction
between physical and effective quantities of a particular good (ie input or output). The
relationship between the physical and the effective units of an input (or output) can be
economy given predetermined endowments of aggregate factors such as labor and capital (see Kohli
1991 for this type of application).
7represented by q 1* = qj.'i  where qi* is the effective quantity of the good; q 1 is the actual
quantity  of the  good;  and  Tj  is the level of input-augmenting technology 5. A good
example of such a technical change would be one that increased the efficiency with which
a particular fuel could be converted into usable energy, for example, the use of improved
combustion techniques  that  raised  the  energy efficiency of  coal  used  in  electricity
generation from 25 to 35 percent.  Using the definition above, this improvement raises
the number of effective units in any given physical quantity of coal by 40 percent.
Clearly,  increases in  the  number  of  effective units  associated  with  a  given
physical quantity of fuel allow reductions in the quantity of fuel, and hence CO 2 emitted,
in  achieving  any  given  outcome.  The  effects  of  this  change  in  the  input-output
coefficients appears to be the main thing currently considered in evaluating the impacts of
projects on greenhouse gas emissions (World Bank forthcoming).
Associated with the increase in the effective quantity of good i is a change in its
effective price. The relationship between actual and effective prices is given by p;  = Pi  /Tj
where pi*  is the effective price of the good. Clearly, the impact of the improvement in
efficiency considered above is to reduce the effective price of this type of energy. In most
cases, however, it is not enough to consider the impact of the technical change on the
input-output coefficients. Typically, the sponsor of a project has the ability to influence
these coefficients, but not to fully control the operation of the project, or the industry of
which it is a part, in the host country. Industrial managers can be expected to respond to
the changes in the effective prices resulting from the technical change. Depending upon
5  For expositional ease, technical change has been specified so that an  increase in ri represents an
improvement in technology.
8the relevant elasticities, this may substantially change the impact of the project on total
carbon emissions.
From the above discussion, it is clear that changes in technology that change the
effective prices of particular types of energy in a particular application have both output
and substitution effects. The nature of these effects is very readily seen using a demand
function for a particular energy input, such as the following linear demand curve resulting
from differentiation with  respect to  effective prices of a  normalized quadratic profit
function specified in effective quantities and prices.
(1)  qi  =  cj  + E  ,Bjj  pi  + Sk Oik  Vk
Since the  physical  quantity  of  the  fuel  consumed, rather  than  the  effective
quantity, typically determines the quantity of greenhouse gas  emissions, we  need to
rewrite this equation in terms of actual prices and quantities, rather than effective prices
and quantities.
(2)  qi =  /i 1i (ac +  , Pij  Pi*  + Sk  Oik  Vk)  =  1/-Ti  (ai  + Ej  pj /tj +  Sk  Oik  Vk)
a  formulation which highlights the input-saving consequences of the technical
change.
Since p> is equal to pi/t 1 the lowering of the effective price has an effect that
depends upon the slope of the demand curve. The contribution of the two effects to
demand for the physical product is shown in Figure 1. The shift from Demand Curve Do
to  D] corresponds to the impact of the 1/-X 1 term at the front of the right hand side of
equation (2). It causes the demand curve to rotate about the vertical axis. The impact of
9the effective price change is represented by the rotation of curve DI around the horizontal
axis. The decline in the effective price of the input stimulates demand to an extent that
depends  on  the  slope  of  the  demand curve  and  on  the  price  level.  This  effect  is
represented by the rotation of the demand curve from D, to D2. In the diagram, the input-
saving effect of the technical change dominates and demand at price p is lower with the
final demand curve D2 than with the original demand curve. However, this would not
have been the case at higher price levels, or with a more elastic demand curve.




°  Physical quantity
While the impact of an input-augmenting technical change on the demand for any
particular energy source is ambiguous in general, the elasticity of demand for the good
gives a local approximation to the impact. If, for instance, the elasticity of demand for the
10good  is less  (greater) than one,  the compensated 6 demand for the  input will  decline
(increase) following an input-augmenting technical advance.
The ambiguous impact of the change in effective prices on own demand is not the
end of the story because the change in the effective price of the good will also change the
demand for other production inputs through substitution effects. In this case, at least, the
direction of the impact is clear as long as the goods are substitutes - a reduction in the
effective price of one fuel will reduce the demand for any substitute fuel. Even if the
demand for a fuel rises following the technical change, this effect may offset the impact
on aggregate carbon emissions. If the demand for an alternative fuel has fallen, then this
substitution effect will augment the reduction in fuel use and carbon emissions. Whether
the substitution effects will outweigh the own price impacts will depend a great deal on
the carbon intensity of the fuels; if the fuel whose use  is expanding is  more carbon
intensive than its substitutes, then overall emissions may rise as a consequence of the
project.
While input-augmenting technical change seems likely to be the most relevant for
most cases considered under joint  implementation, type (c) technical change might be
important in some applications. Changes in technology of this type are very difficult to
implement in the flexible functional forms so widely used in  modern applied studies
because of the restrictions imposed by economic theory, including homogeneity of degree
one in prices; symmetry of cross price effects; and the adding up restrictions. However,
this approach has sometimes been used for broad technical changes such as the very large
6  That is, output-constant.
11shift in demand towards more skilled labor in the industrial countries (Tyers and Yang
1997). For most applications likely to be encountered in joint  implementation projects,
the input-augmenting technical change approach appears likely to be the most useful.
Relevant elasticities of demand for energy and emissions intensities
The  practical  importance of  the  changes  in  effective  prices  induced  by  the
technical  changes caused  by joint  implementation will  depend a  great  deal  on  the
magnitudes of the relevant elasticities of demand for energy inputs, and  for energy-
intensive  final  products.  Where these  elasticities are small,  the  induced  impacts  of
changes in effective prices will almost always be small.
Three groups of elasticities need to be considered. The first is the elasticities of
demand for particular energy sources. The second is the demand for energy as a whole.
The third is the elasticity of demand for energy-intensive products.
As Atkinson and  Manning (1995) observe, the literature on the elasticities of
demand for energy is not in very satisfactory, with the range of estimates for different
parameters being particularly  wide,  especially for  the cross-price effects that  are  of
importance in this  analysis. Further, the full  implications of recent  developments in
econometric techniques being only partially reflected in the stock of elasticity estimates.
Despite this, some regularities do seem to emerge fairly strongly.
12The own and cross price elasticities of demand for individual energy sources do
generally seem to be larger than the elasticity of demand for energy as a whole. From the
range of estimates presented by Atkinson and Manning (1995), it seems likely that the
own-price elasticity  of demand  for  energy as  a  whole  is  in  the  order  of  -0.2. The
elasticities of  demand for  particular  energy-intensive goods  also  seem likely  to  be
relatively low. Further, the impact of a change in the effective price of a particular fuel
has only an indirect impact on the price of the good in which it is embodied. Assuming
the good is nontraded, and produced according to constant returns to scale, the maximum
price impact will be given by the share of the fuel in the total cost of producing the good.
Thus, except for goods such as aluminium or home-produced goods such as  electric
lighting,  which are particularly energy intensive, it seems likely  that the  impacts of
technical changes on consumption of final goods will be relatively minor. In a  small
country, such changes will be unobservable for traded goods because the price of the
good will not be affected by changes in the domestic technology alone.
The elasticities of demand for individual fuels, such as gas, oil and coal generally
appear to be much larger, with values above 1.0, and even above 2.0, in absolute value
frequently appearing in the literature. Where the own price elasticities are large, the cross
price elasticities typically are also large, making evaluation of the substitution effects
considerably more important.
It seems likely that, with such large elasticities, both the own-price effects induced
by input-augmenting technical change, and the substitution effects from this source, will
be important. A simple numerical example is used to explore the potential sensitivity of
13the effects of  projects that improve the efficiency with which particular types of energy
are used.
To explore the effects of projects on overall energy use requires knowledge of the
price elasticities of demand, and the CO2  intensity of each fuel. The price elasticities need
to be derived from comprehensive, system-based approaches because of the importance
of  the  cross-price impacts  that tend to  be  poorly  estimated when traditional,  single
commodity  estimation  approaches  are  used.  There  are  many  levels  at  which  an
exploratory analysis might be undertaken. However, the area in which the best estimates
of demand elasticities appear to be available is use in the industrial sector. Jones (1996)
provides  a comprehensive set of elasticity estimates for the G-7 countries utilizing a
modem  system-based  econometric  estimator,  the  linear-logit  estimator  applied  to
aggregate data. Pindyck (1979) provides a similar set of estimates obtained by applying
the Translog estimator to national data for a group of OECD countries. Woodland (1993)
provides estimates based on a panel of establishment-level data for New South Wales
industrial  firms  over  an  eight-year period.  Another  set  of  estimates  underlies  the
simulation modeling undertaken by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1995a) using the G-Cubed
model.
The elasticities estimated by Jones (1996) are based on inter-fuel substitution in
the  industrial  sector.  He  allows  for  substitution  between coal,  oil,  natural  gas  and
electricity. Thus his results provide estimates of the direct usage of coal, oil and natural
gas in the industrial sector, which should be comparable with the data on energy use and
CO2 emissions by sector provided by the International Energy Agency.  He provides both
short run and long run estimates. The long run elasticities are used here because of the
14long  run focus  of the  global warming problem. The matrix  of own  and cross price
elasticities of demand for direct use of coal, oil, and gas is provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Long run elasticities of demand in the industrial sector of the G-7
Coal  Oil  Gas
Coal  -1.55  0.72  0.15
Oil  0.63  -2.23  0.78
Gas  0.13  0.79  -0.86
The  elasticities presented in  Table  1 are higher than  many  in  the  literature.
However,  they do  not  appear  unreasonable as  estimates of  the  long  run  values  of
elasticities allowing for inter-fuel substitution. Pindyck's  comparable estimates of the
own-price elasticity of demand for individual OECD countries were in the same range for
coal, generally lower for oil, and generally higher for natural gas. Woodland's estimates
based on data at the  establishment level are generally somewhat lower for coal  and
substantially higher for natural gas. Jones' estimates are, however, considerably above the
comparable estimates utilized by McKibbin and Wilcoxen, who apply an energy elasticity
of substitution of 0.80 in the durable manufacturing sector and 1.0 in the non-durable
sub-sector.
Unfortunately, there appears to be a dearth of recent system-based estimates of the
elasticities of demand for fuels in developing countries. If the underlying parameters of
the system are the same, it would be possible to utilize the estimates provided by Jones,
together with information on the shares of  each fuel in total  energy use, to  estimate
elasticities for particular developing countries. However, it would be very desirable to
have  estimates  actually  obtained  using  data  from  developing  countries.  If  joint
15implementation becomes an important feature of the implementation of global strategies
for greenhouse gas mitigation, it will be particularly important to have such estimates.
The other information needed to investigate the impact of any given improvement
in energy use efficiency is the importance of each fuel as a source both of energy and of
emissions in the industrial sector. These data were obtained from the International Energy
Agency (1997, 1991) and are presented in Table 2. The first column shows estimated CO 2
emissions  from  direct  use  of  each  fuel in  the industrial  sector  and  the  second  the
corresponding shares. The third column shows the delivered fuel emission factors, taking
into account both the inherent carbon intensity of each fuel and the efficiency with which
it used to provide usable energy. The final column shows the implied shares of each fuel
in total usable energy availability from these fuels in the industrial sector.
Table 2. IEA estimates of energy and emissions data for the industrial sector of
Annex I Parties
CO 2 emissions  Emission  shares  Emission  factors  Energy  shares
Million  Mt CO2 %  Mt C/Mtoe  %
Coal  945.5  40  1.14  32
Oil  677.3  29  0.89  29
Gas  734  31  0.73  39
Total  2356.8  100  100
This short survey of relevant elasticities and emission intensities points to some
likely implications of different types of joint implementation that results in different types
of improvements in  fuel use  efficiency. The much higher elasticities of  demand for
individual fuels, than for energy as a whole, implies that substitution between fuels is
likely  to  be  important for  its  effects on  quantities of  fuel used.  The very  different
emissions intensities mean that changes in the mix of fuels used will have major impacts
on fuel emissions. Projects that increase the efficiency of a fuel that is carbon intensive
16may induce greater use of that fuel relative to less emission-intensive fuels. Conversely,
increases in the efficiency of a less carbon intensive fuel will shift energy usage towards
that  fuel, with potentially  important second-round savings in  carbon emissions. The
importance of substitution between fuels means, however, that technical changes that
increase efficiency for all fuels will create smaller induced substitution impacts.
Some stylized experiments
The experiments undertaken to highlight some of the important features of the
problem were increases in energy use efficiency sufficient, with no other adjustments, to
reduce total  CO 2 emissions by  ten percent. This  target required improvements of  25
percent, 35 percent and 32 percent for coal, oil and gas respectively. The results of this
direct energy-saving effect on total emissions are shown in column 1 of Table 3.
Because of the reduction in the effective price of each energy source resulting
from the improvement in technology, there are impacts on the consumption both of the
fuel itself and other fuels. The impact of the reduction in the effective price of each fuel
on emissions directly from that fuel is shown in Column 2 of the table. The total effective
price induced impact is shown in Column 3. These estimates differ from those in Column
2 by taking into account the substitution effects on usage of, and emissions from, other
fuels.
17The total impact of the change in efficiency is shown in Column 4 of the table.
These estimates include both the direct impact on emissions, and that induced by the
changes in effective price.
Table  3. Impacts  of improvements  in fuel  use efficiency  on total C02 emissions,  percent
Direct  impact  Own effective  All effective  Total  impact
price impacts  Price impacts
Coal  efficiency  -10  15.5  10.0  0.0
Oil efficiency  -10  22.3  3.7  -6.3
Gas efficiency  -10  8.6  -0.5  -10.5
All fuels  -30  46.4  13.2  -16.8
The improvement in coal use efficiency shown in the first row of the table would
directly reduce total emissions by ten percent if there were no changes in the input or
output mix. However, the own price effect of the reduction in the effective price of coal
increases total emissions by over 15 percent as emission-intensive coal is substituted for
oil and gas. This adverse effect is offset by the reductions in carbon emissions resulting
from the induced reductions in oil and gas usage. The net impact of all the price-induced
changes in the fuel mix on direct consumption of fossil fuels is an increase of ten percent.
This increase of ten percent exactly offsets the direct reduction in consumption resulting
from the increase in efficiency, leaving this increase in energy use efficiency completely
ineffective in reducing CO 2 emissions.
The improvement in oil use efficiency has, by construction, the same impact on
emissions as the efficiency improvement in coal. Because the elasticity of demand for oil
is  so  high,  this  change  in  the  effective price of  oil  has  a  larger  impact  on  direct
consumption of oil than was the case with coal. When only the own-price impact is taken
18into account, the effect on emissions is more strongly adverse than for coal, with a 22
percent  increase in total emissions. However, the substitution effects are more strongly
favorable both because of the elasticities, and because of the higher emission intensity of
coal.  With these  substitution effects  included, the  total  price-induced  impact  is  an
increase in emissions of 3.7 percent. Thus, in this case, the price-induced impact only
partially offsets the direct energy-saving impact of the technical change.
The efficiency improvement in the use of natural gas presented in the third row of
Table  3  causes  an  induced increase  in  natural gas  usage. However,  the increase  in
emissions resulting from this is more than offset by the induced reductions in the use of
coal and oil, so that the total price-induced impact is  -0.5 percent, reinforcing the direct
reduction in the energy use. Had the own and cross-price elasticities been larger, as they
were in Woodland's (1993) study, it is likely that the total price-induced impact would
have been a substantially larger negative value, augmenting the direct impact to a much
greater degree. The result from this experiment supports the general principle that, other
things equal, an improvement in efficiency in what is already the most energy-efficient
technology will have a more favorable impact on emissions than an improvement in a
less efficient technology.
When simultaneous increases in efficiency in all fuels are considered, the direct
reduction in emissions is 30 percent. The increase in emissions resulting from own-price
induced increases in fuel usage is 46.4 percent, but this figure falls to only  13.2 percent
once substitution effects are taken into account. Thus, the overall reduction in emissions
resulting from this  experiment is  16.8 percent. This experiment supports the general
principle that substitution effects are less a concern for a broad-based improvement that
19increases efficiency for all fuels than for improvements concentrated only in emission-
intensive fuels.
The numerical examples provided in this section are deliberately simplified and
stylized. They represent only the impacts on direct use of fuels in  industry, ignoring
indirect consumption in the form of electricity (unless this is generated from nonpolluting
or renewable sources). Further, they ignore the indirect impacts on energy consumption
and emissions that arise from induced changes in demand for energy in total, and from
induced effects  on the  prices of  particular commodities. Their  purpose is  purely to
highlight  the  potentially  important,  and  frequently  ignored,  impacts  of  changes  in
effective prices on fuel consumption and on emission levels.
Supply side considerations
All of the analysis to this point has focused on the demand side of the market for
energy. However, the impact of a reduction in the demand for fuel on its consumption
will clearly also depend upon the price responsiveness of fuel supply. If the fuels are not
in  perfectly elastic supply, reductions in demand will not  be translated directly into
reductions in  the quantity of fuel used. As demand declines, the price will fall, thus
stimulating fuel use and partially offsetting the effects of the original decline in demand.
This introduces another factor that may need to be taken into account when comparing
joint  implementation  outcomes  with  those  from  outcome-based  measures  such  as
tradeable quotas.
20On the supply side, the cross-price impacts are probably much smaller than on the
demand side simply because of the diversity of the natural resource bases involved in the
production of major fuels such as coal, oil and gas. While all produced goods are general
equilibrium substitutes (or complements) in production simply through their demands for
resources, it seems likely that these cross-price impacts are relatively small, and that
attention can focus primarily on the own-price elasticities.
As long as the elasticity of fuel supply lies between zero and infinity, the impact
of any technology-induced reduction in demand will fall partly on the price of the fuel,
and partly on fuel usage. The reduction in price will to some degree offset the original
reduction  in  demand,  introducing  an  additional  offset  to  the  effectiveness  of joint
implementation that is quite different from the one discussed on the demand side. The
magnitude of the reduction in price, for any given horizontal shift in the demand curve,
will depend upon the sum of the elasticities of supply and demand. The exact impact of
the shift on the demand for fuel depends, however, on the individual elasticities and on
the nature of the shift in the demand curve. For example, for any given horizontal shift in
the demand curve, the reduction in demand is greater, the higher is the absolute value of
the supply elasticity. Similarly, the reduction in demand will be less, the larger is the
absolute elasticity of demand.
In the short run, the elasticity of supply of the major fuels is probably fairly
inelastic because of the quasi-fixed nature of investments in resource extraction. Over
time, these elasticities tend to rise as it becomes possible to invest in new capital, and to
invest in the discovery and proving of new reserves. Since the  supply of capital and
exploration services to these industries is highly elastic, it seems likely that the long run
21elasticities of supply for the major energy sources are quite elastic, substantially reducing
the need to account for supply-side offsetting impacts of joint implementation projects.
The supply side effects considered in this section and the demand side impacts
considered in the remainder of this paper can be  integrated using computable general
equilibrium models such  as the  GTAP model  (Hertel  1997) or  the G-Cubed model
(McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1995b). These models include both the demand and supply side
linkages. In  any  such analysis, it  is particularly important to  focus  attention on the
specification of the change in demand for energy, and on the effects of shifts in demand
on energy supply.
Conclusions and policy implications
Much of the literature on evaluating the impacts of joint implementation projects
appears to assume that an improvement in efficiency that reduces the amount of fuel
required to achieve a particular objective by 10 percent will reduce the quantity of
emissions by the same 10 percent. The main purpose of this paper is to point out that
technological advances of the most common kind have two impacts-one  through their
direct energy-saving impact, and one through their impact on the effective price of the
fuel in the use(s) under consideration. UJnfortunately,  this channel of effect appears to
have been ignored in much of the recent literature on evaluation ofjointly  implemented
projects or demand side management.
22The direct impact of the reduction in the effective price of a fuel is an increase in
the consumption of that fuel. In addition, there are substitution effects that will generally
reduce the use of other fuels, and the emissions generated from that source. If the fuel
whose efficiency is being improved is already the least emission-intensive, the combined
impact of these price impacts is most likely to be favorable. If the fuel whose efficiency is
being improved is initially the most emission-intensive,  the combined impact of these
price changes is less likely to be favorable, and may even result in an increase in
emissions. In the numerical example considered in this paper, an increase in coal use
efficiency was completely ineffective in reducing emissions because it resulted in
emission-intensive coal being substituted for less polluting oil and gas.
The final impact of the demand shifts on fuel consumption and energy emissions
will also depend on supply side responses in energy markets. As long as energy supply is
less than perfectly elastic, reductions in energy demand resulting from joint
implementation will reduce the market price of energy and stimulate energy use, partially
offsetting the initial reduction in demand. These effects are likely to be substantially
larger in the long run, reducing the magnitude of these offsets.
Many analysts have advocated ignoring the offsetting effects that are the focus of
this paper on the grounds of lack of information. While the need to form some assessment
of the magnitude of the relevant demand elasticities is a serious difficulty given the
paucity of estimates of elasticities for developing countries, it need not be insuperable.
Further, the general principles following from the analysis provide a (potentially
rebuttable) case for favoring particular types of projects. Projects that improve the
23efficiency of the fuel that is already the least emission-intensive are likely to be more
effective than projects focusing on more emission-intensive  fuels. Projects that improve
the efficiency of all fuels are unlikely to be offset by adverse substitution effects. By
contrast, projects that improve the efficiency of an emission-intensive  process may be
completely ineffective in reducing carbon emissions.
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